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Reputation and Credit Market Formation: 
How Relational Incentives and Legal Contract Enforcement Interact
*
 
The evidence suggests that relational contracting and legal rules play an important role in 
credit markets but on the basis of the prevailing field data it is difficult to pin down their causal 
impact. Here we show experimentally that relational incentives are a powerful causal 
determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In fact, in the absence of 
legal enforcement and reputation formation opportunities the credit market breaks down 
almost completely while if reputation formation is possible a stable credit market emerges 
even in the absence of legal enforcement of debt repayment. Introducing legal enforcement 
of repayments causes a further significant increase in credit market trading but has only a 
surprisingly small impact on overall efficiency. The reason is that legal enforcement of debt 
repayments weakens relational incentives and exacerbates another moral hazard problem in 
credit markets – the choice of inefficient high-risk projects. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  C91, G21, G28, L14 
  





Ernst Fehr  





E-mail: efehr@iew.uzh.ch       
 
                
 
                                                 
* We would like to acknowledge financial support from the Research Priority Program of the University 
of Zurich on the "Foundations of Human Social Behavior" and the National Center of Competence in 
Research on “Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR Finrisk). The National Centers in 
Research are managed by the Swiss National Science Foundation on behalf of the federal authorities. I. Introduction 
 
Around the world credit markets are a major source of financing business projects (Rajan and 
Zingales  1995,  Djankov,  McLiesh  and  Shleifer  2007)  and  it  is  well  known  that  adverse 
selection  and  moral  hazard  (Jaffee  and  Russel  1976,  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  1981)  are  major 
obstacles for the development of these markets. Recent work has indicated the importance of 
legal rules and information sharing institutions for the functioning of credit markets (Pagano 
and  Japelli  1993,  La  Porta  and  Lopez  de-Silanes  1997,  La  Porta  et  al.  1998,  Japelli  and 
Pagano 2002, Lerner and Schoar 2005, Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco 2005; Djankov, McLiesh 
and Shleifer 2007), while a different literature has stressed the role of relationship banking 
and  individual  reputation  mechanisms  (Petersen  and  Rajan  1994,  Berger  and  Udell  1995, 
Boot 2000, Boot and Thakor 2000, Ongena and Smith 2000 and 2001, Degryse and Ongena 
2005).  However,  although  reputation  mechanisms  are  relatively  well  understood  at  the 
theoretical level (Sobel 1985, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986), it is very difficult to show with 
field data that individual reputation formation is causally involved in relationship banking and 
the  endogenous  enforcement  of  credit  repayments.  Furthermore,  both  “institutions”  and 
“relations”  almost  always  simultaneously  affect  credit  market  behavior  and  very  little  is 
known  about  how  these  enforcement  mechanisms  interact.  It  is  not  known  whether 
“institutions” and “relations” complement each other or whether legal enforcement “crowds 
out” reputational enforcement mechanisms.  
In this paper we, therefore, use the methods of experimental economics to examine 
how reputation formation opportunities causally influence contract enforcement and market 
efficiency in credit markets.
4 In addition, our experiment allows us to study the causal impact 
of  legal  third  party  enforcement  of  credit  contracts  and  the  interaction  between  legal 
enforcement and the endogenous enforcement of contracts in long-term credit relations. For 
this purpose, we conduct experiments in a laboratory environment in which two potential 
sources  of  moral  hazard  coexist.  The  first  source  of  moral  hazard  is  the  presence  of 
asymmetric information about project characteristics. Since lenders do not observe the project 
choice,  they  cannot  prevent  borrowers  from  choosing  inefficient  high-risk  projects.  This 
reflects the natural information asymmetry in credit markets: borrowers typically have more 
and better information about their investment opportunities than lenders. The second source 
for moral hazard is the absence of legal enforcement of debt repayment. This implies that 
                                                 
4 Laboratory experiments have a long tradition in the study of financial markets. For example, already Burell 
(1951) used an experiment to investigate investment behavior in a controlled way. In the last two decades the 
experimental literature has importantly contributed to a better understanding of price determination in security 
and asset markets. For examples see, Ang and Schwarz (1985), Copeland and Friedman (1987, 1991), O’Brien 
and Srivastava (1991), Schnitzlein (1996), Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997), Gneezy et al. (2003), Kluger and 
Wyatt (2004), Haigh and List (2005), and Haruvy and Noussair (2006).   3 
borrowers may escape the repayment of their loans even in case of a successfully realized 
project. A lack of enforceable repayments can be interpreted as a stylized representation of the 
institutional weaknesses observed in many developing and emerging credit markets but recent 
evidence (Djankov et al. 2008) suggests that even in many advanced Western countries the 
enforcement of debt repayment is surprisingly inefficient.  
The enhanced control provided by the experimental method enables us to isolate the 
pure effect of individual reputation formation in endogenously built long-term relationships 
on the solution of the double moral hazard problem. We compare a treatment in which we rule 
out  any  information  about  the  identity  of  trading  partners  (so  that  no  reputation  can  be 
formed) with a treatment in which individual borrowers can acquire a reputation. A main 
reason for the conduct of our experiments is that it is rarely possible to find field data in 
which information about the traders’ identity varies exogenously. Therefore, field data do 
typically not allow for the clean identification of the extent to which reputational incentives 
are causally involved in solving the moral hazard problems inherent in credit markets. 
Once we have identified the pure reputation effect on credit market functioning, we 
are in a position to study the interaction between legal enforcement of credit repayment and 
reputational  incentives.  We  do  this  by  implementing  third  party  enforcement  of  credit 
repayments under conditions of limited liability and wealth constraints for the borrowers. In 
particular, the third party can force the borrower to repay his loan if the borrower’s project 
turns  out  to  be  successful  but  if  the  project  fails  no  repayment  can  be  enforced  because 
borrowers have no wealth that could be taken away from them. While third party enforcement 
resolves  the  credit  repayment  problem,  the  borrowers  still  have  the  possibility  to  choose 
inefficient high risk projects. This may be attractive because limited liability implies that they 
can shift part of the project risk on the lenders. We believe that this set-up characterizes the 
situation in many advanced Western economies in which borrowers’ cannot easily escape 
their legal obligations to repay their debt if they have resources that can be taken away from 
them but once their projects fail and they lack sufficient wealth, the legal system can do little 
to ensure debt repayment.  
Our results indicate that individual reputation formation in long-term credit relations 
has a powerful impact on the enforcement of credit contracts. In the absence of third party 
enforcement, the lack of reputation formation opportunities leads to a breakdown in credit 
market trading. If borrowers can acquire a reputation, however, stable credit markets emerge 
in which roughly 80% of all feasible trades take place. If borrowers’ identities are known the 
lenders condition future credit offers on the borrower’s current repayment behavior such that 
the borrowers face incentives to repay their debt and to choose the efficient low-risk project. 
Thus,  reputation  formation  in  endogenously  formed  long-term  credit  relations  strongly   4 
alleviates the double moral hazard problem in our credit market although it does not solve it 
completely. 
The  introduction  of  third  party  enforcement  into  a  market  in  which  reputation 
formation plays a key role in contract enforcement leads to a further significant increase in 
trading  activity.  Interestingly,  third  party  enforcement  does  not  reduce  the  prevalence  of 
multi-period  credit  interactions  between  pairs  of  borrowers  and  lenders.  However,  the 
efficiency gains from third party enforcement are surprisingly small and insignificant because 
it exacerbates the project choice problem. In fact, without third party enforcement the efficient 
project is chosen in 90% of the cases while in the presence of third party enforcement this 
occurs only in roughly 50% of the cases.  
The likely reason for the decrease in efficient projects is twofold. First, in the presence 
of legal enforcement of repayments, borrowers face stronger short-term incentives to choose 
the  inefficient  project.  Due  to  limited  liability  and  wealth  constraints  borrowers  who  are 
forced to repay in case of project success can increase their expected short-term-profit by 
choosing the risky project because the increased risk is partly borne by the lender. This effect 
is especially strong because legal enforcement of debt repayment also strengthens the lenders’ 
position in the market and induces them to ask for higher repayments. Second, we find that 
the  conditioning  of  future  credit  on  current  repayment  is  weaker  under  third  party 
enforcement, i.e., incumbent borrowers who repay their credit experience a lower increase in 
the probability of receiving future credit. Together these two factors imply that third party 
enforcement weakens the incentives for efficient project choices in important ways which 
leads to a lower prevalence of efficient projects. 
Our  study  is  related  to  the  literature  on  relationship  banking  that  examines  the 
economic role and the determinants of long-term relations between borrowers and lenders 
(Petersen and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995, Boot 2000, Boot and Thakor 2000, Ongena 
and Smith 2000 and 2001, Degryse and Ongena 2005). This literature provides convincing 
evidence  for  the  prevalence  and  the  potentially  value-enhancing  role  of  long-term 
relationships in credit markets. In principle, long-term relations could be valuable because the 
lender has access to the borrower’s books and thus receives more direct insights into the 
borrower’s  economic  activities  which  enable  her  to  better  assess  the  risks  involved  in 
providing  credit.  Alternatively,  long-term  relations  may  be  a  consequence  of  lenders’ 
contingent renewal of future credit contracts: if lenders condition access to future credit on the 
repayment of current debt the borrowers face incentives to repay their debt. Thus, here the 
existence of long-term credit relations merely results from the successful repayment of credit 
which is itself a result of the incentives provided by contingent contract renewal.    5 
It is hard, if not impossible, to disentangle these forces in existing field data while our 
experiment enables us to isolate them in a clean way. In particular, in the experiments the 
lender never had access to information about the borrower’s past or current project choices. 
Therefore, we can rule out that long-term relations are associated with better information 
access. Instead, long-term relations are a result of lenders’ contingent renewal policy, the 
associated incentives for credit repayment and efficient project choices and, therefore, they 
enhance the gains from trade in our credit markets. 
Our study is also related to the literature on the role of legal enforcement institutions 
in credit markets (e.g., La Porta and Lopez de-Silanes 1997, La Porta et al. 1998, Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer 2007). This literature documents that the role of private credit in a 
market  economy  increases  with  creditor  protection,  indicating  an  important  role  of  legal 
enforcement institutions. The interpretation of correlational data is however not easy because 
causation can go in both directions. Creditor protection may cause flourishing credit markets 
but  it  is  also  possible  that  credit  markets  emerge  through  endogenous  (reputational) 
enforcement mechanisms and that higher credit market participation causes political pressures 
that strengthen creditors’ rights. In view of the uncertainty whether reverse causation is partly 
behind the observed link between creditor protection and the economic role of private credit 
in cross country comparisons, an experimental study of the role of legal enforcement of credit 
repayment  is  valuable  because  in  the  experiment  we  can  rule  out  reverse  causation  with 
certainty. Thus, we can be completely sure that the increased level of trading activity under 
legal enforcement is caused by the enforcement institution.  
In addition, the exogenous introduction of legal enforcement in an environment with 
endogenous enforcement of credit contracts enables us to study the causal impact of legal on 
endogenous enforcement. To the best of our knowledge we are the first ones who empirically 
address the important question of how endogenous (reputation based) incentives interact with 
exogenous  (legal)  incentives.  Our  finding  that  legal  enforcement  weakens  reputational 
incentives and increases the frequency of inefficient project choices indicates that legal and 
endogenous enforcement mechanisms may have unexpected interactions which renders the 
further study of such interaction effects worthwhile.
5 
Since we investigate the disciplining power of relationships our work is also related to 
the  literature  on  reputation  formation  in  repeated  games  (Kreps  et  al.  1982,  Sobel  1985, 
                                                 
5 Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) provide a theoretical analysis between explicit incentives and relational 
incentives  in  a  firm–worker  relationship.  They  show  that  better  explicit  incentives  may  weaken  relational 
incentives  because  a  better  explicit  incentive  reduces  the  firm’s  ability  to  commit  to  bonus  payments  that 
incentivize  the  workers’  effort.  In  our  setting,  the  crowding  out  of  relational  incentives  through  legal 
enforcement of debt repayment is based on a different mechanism – the lender’s weaker conditioning of future 
credit on current repayment. An examination of the interaction between informal and formal enforcement in 
partnerships is provided by Sobel (2006).   6 
Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). This literature shows that cooperation can be sustained as an 
equilibrium  in  situations  involving  repeated  play.  However,  the  theory  also  reveals  (e.g. 
Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) that there is in general a plethora of equilibria some of which 
involve  full  cooperation  while  others  involve  complete  defection  by  all  players.  For  this 
reason, theory alone provides little guidance regarding the likely consequences of reputation 
formation for the functioning of credit markets. Recent experimental work provides evidence 
that reputation formation can indeed mitigate moral hazard problems. For example, Brown et 
al.  (2004)  find  that  individual  reputation  effects  have  efficiency  enhancing  effects  in 
endogenously formed employment relationships and Brown and Zehnder (2007) show that 
information sharing among lenders provides strong incentive for borrowers to repay their 
debt. However, our experiment differs from these experiments in important aspects. First, the 
former experiments make reputation formation easy because they use deterministic setups in 
which the principal can directly observe the agent’s action whereas our set-up captures a key 
characteristic of credit markets – asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and 
uncertainty about project success. For this reason, previous experiments also cannot study the 
simultaneous  occurrence  and  interaction  of  the  two  key  moral  hazard  problems  in  credit 
markets  –  the  repayment  problem  and  the  project  choice  problem.  Second,  previous 
experimental  studies  also  do  not  examine  the  interaction  between  legal  enforcement  and 
relation incentives.  
In the presence of stochastic project success and asymmetric information it is far from 
obvious that repeated interactions are capable of sustaining cooperation between borrowers 
and lenders. The reason is that the lenders cannot observe the borrower’s project choice nor 
can they observe whether the project has been successful; they can only observe whether the 
borrower repays his credit. If a borrower does not repay his credit in the market without legal 
enforcement the lender does not know whether the borrower is unable to repay his credit 
(because the project failed) or unwilling to repay his debt. Even an honest borrower who 
intends to repay his debt in case of project success and who chooses the efficient low risk 
project may face a project failure so that he cannot repay his debt. The lender never has 
certainty about whether he faced an opportunistic borrower who did not intend to repay his 
debt even in case of project success or whether the borrower had just bad luck. The double 
moral hazard problem in our credit market makes it thus very difficult to acquire a reputation 
as  a  good  borrower,  which  makes  the  powerful  effect  of  individual  reputation  formation 
opportunities on contract enforcement all the more remarkable.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section II we present the details 
of our experimental design and the applied procedures. Section III contains our predictions 
and hypotheses. In Section IV we present our results and Section V concludes the paper.   7 
II. Experimental Design 
 
We implement an experimental credit market, in which two sources for moral hazard coexist. 
Since  the  lender  cannot  observe  the  borrower’s  project  choice,  borrowers  may  choose 
inefficient high risk projects. In addition, the absence of legal enforcement of repayments 
implies that borrowers may withhold their repayment even if they have successfully realized 
their project. In a first step, we investigate in how far reputational incentives in endogenously 
formed relationships succeed in improving credit market efficiency when both sources for 
moral  hazard  are  present.  In  a  second  step,  we  introduce  legal  enforcement  of  credit 
repayments  and  therewith  eliminate  one  of  the  two  potential  moral  hazard  problems.  We 
study how this interacts with the reputational incentives in relationships and examine the 
overall impact of the legal enforceability of repayments on credit market efficiency. 
We implement three treatment conditions in our experiment. The first condition is a 
baseline  treatment  which  is  designed  to  show  that  our  market  suffers  from  severe  moral 
hazard problems if neither relational nor legal enforceability of contracts is available. In this 
condition  credit  repayments  of  borrowers  are  not  legally  enforceable  and  lenders  are 
confronted with anonymous borrowers in every period. The borrowers’ anonymity rules out 
reputational incentives because it makes the formation of long-term relations between lenders 
and  borrowers  infeasible.  Experimentally,  anonymity  is  guaranteed  by  reassigning  a  new 
identification (ID) number to each participant at the beginning of every period. Essentially, 
this treatment implements a series of one-shot credit markets and, therefore, we call it the one-
shot condition (OC). 
The second condition is identical to the OC except for the fact that we now allow for 
the endogenous formation of bilateral relationships. To this end, we assign a fixed ID number 
to every participant. This ID number remains constant over all periods of the session. In this 
condition, a lender can repeatedly offer credit to the same borrower (i.e., the same ID number) 
and, if the borrower accepts these offers, a long-term relationship is established. We call this 
condition the relationship condition (RC). A comparison of the RC and the OC enables us to 
study the impact of reputation formation in endogenously built relationships on credit market 
efficiency. 
To  examine  how  legal  enforcement  of  credit  repayments  affects  credit  market 
efficiency  and  how  it  interacts  with  relational  incentives,  we  conduct  another  treatment 
condition - the third party condition (TPC). The TPC is identical to the RC except that we 
assume that the borrower is subject to a legal bankruptcy procedure which allows liquidating 
the  borrower  whenever  the  repayment  does  not  meet  the  contractually  defined  amount. 
Liquidation is assumed to be sufficiently costly for the borrower such that it is always in the   8 
interest of the borrowers to repay whatever their project returns allow them to repay, up to the 
contractually agreed upon repayment. In order to simplify the experiment we do not explicitly 
implement the liquidation procedure and the associated repayment choice of the borrower. 
Instead, the computer automatically imposes the borrower’s dominant strategy.  
Note that we deliberately implemented a third party condition that solves the moral 
hazard problem with regard to the repayment of project returns in case of successful projects 
while it does not automatically solve the second moral hazard problem – the project choice 
problem. Thus, our third party condition is based on the assumption that there is still sufficient 
asymmetric information between the third party and the borrower such that the third party 
cannot enforce contracts that condition on project choice or project returns. However, as in 
the RC, in the TPC it is of course possible to solve the project choice problem with relational 
incentives and an interesting question is how relational incentives solve this problem when the 
repayment problem is solved.  
This design choice can also be viewed from the following perspective. Depending on 
the details of legal enforcement procedures they can affect credit market efficiency in two 
ways. First, they can provide direct incentives for the borrowers to meet their contractual 
obligations. Second, they can change the informational environment such that the parties are 
able to write more sophisticated explicit contracts by conditioning on a larger set of events, 
thus providing additional incentives for the borrowers.
6 Because it is desirable to disentangle 
the effects of these two aspects of legal enforcement procedures we concentrate in this paper 
on the first one – the direct incentive effect. For this reason, we rule out that the parties can 
write a larger set of contracts under legal enforcement.  
In  all  three  treatments  the  interaction  takes  place  via  computer  terminals  and  the 
traders  don’t  know  other  traders’  personal  identities.  The  traders  only  know  others’ 
identification numbers. For example, lender no. 7 (L7) knows that he is trading with borrower 
no. 5 (B5) in a particular period. In the RC and the TPC B5 denotes the same borrower (and 
L7 denotes the same lender) throughout the experiment while in the OC treatment B5 (L7) is 
randomly assigned to a different borrower (lender) in each period. This method enables us to 
remove confounding effects of home-grown reputations associated with subjects’ personal 
identities from the experiment and to study the causal impact of reputation formation in the 
credit market in a clean way.  
In  all  three  treatments  we  implement  the  same  credit  market  which  lasts  for  20 
identical periods. The market consists of 17 participants. Seven participants are in the role of 
lenders, the other ten are borrowers. The roles are randomly assigned to the subjects at the 
                                                 
6 For a discussion, see, for example, Diamond (1989, pp. 832-833). For an interesting study of the second aspect 
see Lerner and Schoar (2005).   9 
beginning of a session and remain fixed over all periods. In every period each borrower has 
two  projects  available:  project  A  and  project  B  (p  Î  {A,B}).  We  assume  that  there  are 
capacity constraints such that each borrower can at most realize one of the two projects. Both 
projects require an investment i = 32 capital units to be set up. Project A is an efficient low-
risk project with a high expected return but a moderate return in case of project success (R = 
R
A). Project B is an inefficient high-risk project with a lower expected return than project A 
(E[R | p = A] > E[R | p = B]) but a higher return in case of project success (R
B > R
A). A 
project failure always results in a project return of zero (R = 0). In Table I the characteristics 
of the two projects are shown in detail. 
Borrowers do not have any endowments (equity) and they are not able to carry excess 
returns into future periods.
7 This implies that borrowers need external funding to realize a 
project. If a borrower does not conclude a credit contract, he has access to an alternative 
project, which does not require external funding and yields a period payoff of b = 10. 
Each lender is endowed with k = 32 capital units at the beginning of every period. A 
lender has two opportunities to make use of his endowment. He can either invest his whole 
endowment in an endowment-storing technology which yields a payoff of 32 or he can use his 
32 capital units to extend credit to a borrower. A period consists of two stages. The first stage 
of each period is a continuous one-sided auction, in which lenders have the opportunity to 
make  credit  offers  to  borrowers.  A  credit  offer  contains  three  pieces  of  information:  the 
desired  project  (p
d  Î  {A,B}),  the  desired  repayment  in  case  of  project  success  (r
d)  and 
whether the offer is private or public. Public credit offers can be seen and accepted by all 
borrowers. Private credit offers are addressed to a specific borrower and cannot be seen or 
accepted by the other borrowers. Public offers are also displayed on the other lenders' screens. 
A  lender  can  make  as  many  public  and  private  offers  as  he  wants.  However,  as  his 
endowment consists of 32 capital units, it suffices to finance one project only. Thus, as soon 
as a borrower accepts one of the posted offers of a lender a contract is concluded and – at the 
same time – all other outstanding offers of this lender disappear from the market and can no 
longer be accepted. 
In the second stage of each period all borrowers, who have accepted a credit offer, 
choose whether they want to invest the obtained capital in project A or project B. As soon as 
all borrowers have made their investment decisions a random device determines whether a 
project is a success or a failure.
8 In case of a project failure, the project's return is zero and the 
                                                 
7 This is a standard assumption in the theoretical literature focusing on reputation effects (see e.g. Diamond 
(1989) or Vercammen (1995)). It implies that the borrowers’ wealth constraints remain constant over time such 
that dynamic effects do not change the borrowers’ incentives. 
8 To avoid any suspicions concerning manipulations in computerized random devices the project success is 
always determined by publicly throwing a ten-sided dice. Project successes are independent across contracts.   10 
borrower  cannot  make  a  repayment  to  the  lender  (r  =  0).  If  the  project  turns  out  to  be 
successful, the borrower is able the make repayments up to the level of the project return (r £ 
R
p). The project choice and the realized return are private information to the borrower. The 
only information observable to the lender is the repayment decision of the borrower. Thus, in 
the OC and the RC, where debt repayments are not third party enforceable, the lender is not 
only unable to find out which project has been chosen, but in case of no repayment he does 
also not know whether a borrower has suffered from a project failure or has simply kept the 
whole project return to himself. In the TPC, where borrowers are exogenously forced to meet 
the repayment desired by the lender whenever possible (r = min(R, r
d)), the fact that the 
borrower repays reveals that his project was successful, but lenders are not informed about the 
borrower's project choice. 
At the end of the period the payoffs of the market participants are calculated: 
Profit lender  = Repayment (r),  if the lender extends credit 
  = 32 (k),  if the lender uses endowment storing 
Profit borrower  = Project return (R) – Repayment (r),  if the borrower gets credit 
  = 10 (b),   if the alternative project is realized 
Payoff functions, the number of lenders and borrowers and the number of trading 
periods are common knowledge. 
To  make  sure  that  all  participants  fully  understood  the  decision  process  and  the 
payment structure of the game, each participant had to read a detailed set of instructions 
before  a  session  was  started.  After  reading  the  instructions  participants  had  to  answer 
questions that enabled us to check their comprehension of the rules of the experiment (payoff 
computations, information conditions, trading rules, etc).
9 We never started a session before 
all  subjects  had  correctly  answered  all  comprehension  questions.  Additionally  each 
experiment contained two practice periods in order to make the participants familiar with the 
bidding procedures. In both practice periods subjects only went through the first stage of the 
period (auction with credit offers). There were no project and repayment choices and the 
practice periods did not affect the participants’ payoffs. 
All experimental subjects were volunteers. Each participant could only participate in 
one  session  (i.e.,  each  subject  experienced  only  one  of  the  treatment  conditions).  All 
participants  were  students  of  the  University  of  Zurich  or  the  Swiss  Federal  Institute  of 
Technology in Zurich (ETH). We used the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 
                                                                                                                                                         
This is achieved by independently drawing "winning-numbers" for each borrower. The "winning-numbers" are 
displayed in form of a table on the borrowers' screens before the dice is thrown. 
9 Instructions and control questions are available on request.   11 
In total we conducted 15 experimental sessions, five in every treatment condition. We 
had 17 subjects in each session, which makes a total of 255 participants in the experiment. 
The  computerized  experiment  was  programmed  and  conducted  with  the  experimental 
software  z-Tree  (Fischbacher  2007).  A  session  lasted  approximately  ninety  minutes  and 
subjects earned on average 59 Swiss Francs (~50 US-Dollars (January 2008)). 
 
III. Behavioral Predictions 
 
In this section we present the predictions for our experiment. Section III.A contains a game 
theoretic  analysis  of  our  treatment  conditions  for  the  case  of  rational,  profit-maximizing 
market participants. Under this assumption no credit market can exist in the OC and the RC, 
while  in  the  TPC  only  a  very  inefficient  credit  market  emerges  in  which  only  high-risk 
projects  are  realized.  However,  there  is  a  large  empirical  literature  suggesting  that  the 
assumption that all people are exclusively interested in the maximization of their own material 
payoff is empirically wrong (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Camerer 2003, Sobel 2005). Instead, this 
literature indicates that a fraction of people also care about social motives and behave in a 
trustworthy  manner.  In  our  context  trustworthy  behavior  means  that  a  person  voluntarily 
makes credit repayments out of social concerns even if there is a strong monetary incentive 
not to repay. In Section III.B we discuss how the existence of such trustworthy borrowers 
influences credit market trading in our three treatment conditions. We confine the discussion 
of the effects of these traders to the intuitive level in this section. However, we corroborate 
our arguments with a theoretical foundation in the Appendix, where we formally show the 
existence of reputation equilibria for simplified versions of our experimental games in the RC 
and the TPC. 
 
A. Predictions with Rational and Selfish Agents 
 
In this section we derive a benchmark prediction based on the assumption that all traders are 
rational  maximizers  of  expected  profits.  Due  the  finite  time  horizon  of  the  experiment  a 
simple backward induction argument predicts hat in the OC and the RC no credit market 
transactions will take place. Since there is no institution that enforces debt repayment, the 
one-shot  nature  of  the  OC  implies  that  borrowers  never  repay.  Lenders  anticipate  this 
behavior and are therefore not willing to offer credit. The possibility to engage in repeated 
interactions with the same trading partner in the RC does not change this prediction. It is 
important to emphasize that we made it common knowledge that the experiment lasts exactly 
20 periods. Thus, in the final period all participants know that they face the same incentives as 
in a one-shot encounter. Accordingly, the prediction is that lenders are not willing to extend 
credit in the final period. However, because rational borrowers anticipate that they will not be   12 
offered credit in the final period, the lenders cannot discipline the borrowers in the next to last 
period  (lenders  cannot  credibly  offer  future  benefits  for  good  borrower  behavior).  As  a 
consequence, borrowers will not repay credit in the next to last period, implying that no trade 
takes  place  in  this  period  either.  The  same  argument  can  now  be  applied  to  all  periods, 
implying that no credit market will exist in any of the periods. 
In the TPC the existence of third party enforcement of repayments forces borrowers to 
repay as much of the contractually agreed upon repayment as the project’s return allows. 
However, the incentive structure in the stage game is such that – for all credit terms a lender is 
willing  to  offer  –  the  borrower’s  best  response  is  always  project  B.  To  understand  this, 
remember that lenders can always make a safe profit of 32 by investing in the endowment-
storing technology. The expected profit of a lender offering credit to a borrower who choses 
project p is given by E[pL] = w
pr
d. Thus, even in the best case, in which a lender is certain that 
his borrower chooses the efficient project A (which has a success probability of w
A = 0.8), the 
lender is never prepared to make a credit offer with a lower desired repayment than r
d = 40. 
The  expected  profit  of  a  borrower  in  the  TPC  is  only  dependent  on  his  project  choice 
pÎ{A,B} and can be written as follows: E[pB] = w
p(R
p – r
d). Inserting the corresponding 
numbers for projects A and B yields that borrowers prefer project B for all desired repayments 
r
d ³ 40. Thus, all credit offers a profit-maximizing lender is ever willing to make provide 
monetary incentives for borrowers to choose project B. 
Due to the finite number of periods in the experiment, backward induction ensures, 
that the borrowers choose project B in all periods. Since lenders are on the short side of the 
market and anticipate the borrowers' behavior, they will enter the credit market and always 
ask for the highest repayment a borrower is just willing to accept. The borrowers’ highest 
accepted repayment is r
d = 166 because by accepting a repayment of 166 and choosing project 
B a borrower is slightly better off than if he takes his outside-option b = 10: E[pB] = 0.3(200 – 
166) = 10.2 > 10. Contracts with desired repayments above 166 are rejected by the borrowers. 
Thus, in the TPC the assumption that all market participants are rational expected profit-
maximizers implies that a credit market is formed, in which all available trades are realized. 
However, since borrowers only choose inefficient high-risk projects, the credit market in the 
TPC still suffers from the negative consequences of  moral hazard. 
 
B. Predictions with Heterogeneous Borrowers 
 
In  the  last  two  decades  a  large  empirical  literature  emerged  which  suggests  that  not  all 
people’s behavior is exclusively driven by material self interest (for an overview see, e.g., 
Fehr and Gächter 2000, Camerer 2003, Sobel 2005). Instead, a non-negligible share of the 
population also exhibits social preferences, i.e., a concern for fair treatment, fair outcomes   13 
and reciprocity.  In the meantime, there are even results from experiments with nationally 
representative samples (Bellemare and Kröger 2007; Bellemare, Kröger and Van Soest 2008; 
Fehr et al. 2002) which indicate the relevance of social preferences for a non-negligible share 
of people. For individuals with social preferences economic self-interest is still an important 
argument in the utility function but, in addition, the person also shows a concern for fairness 
(Fehr  and  Schmidt  1999,  Bolton  and  Ockenfels  2000)  or  reciprocity  (Rabin  1993, 
Dufwenberg  and  Kirchsteiger  2004,  Falk  and  Fischbacher  2006)  and  sometimes  even  for 
efficiency (Charness and Rabin 2002). 
In our context this means that - in addition to selfish profit-maximizers - there may 
also be borrowers who are prepared to honor the contract if a lender makes a credit offer that 
they perceive as fair, i.e., if the borrower is offered a fair share of the project returns. In the 
following we call such borrowers “trustworthy” borrowers.
10 It is obvious, that if almost all 
borrowers  are  trustworthy  even  the  one-shot  credit  contracts  in  the  OC  may  be  become 
attractive  to  lenders.  The  existing  empirical  evidence  (see  e.g.  Fehr  and  Gächter  2000, 
Camerer 2003) suggests that our setting makes it rather unlikely that social preferences alone 
ensure a functioning credit market.
11 But, whether the actual fraction of trustworthy borrowers 
is sufficient to sustain credit market trading in the OC is, of course, an empirical question. 
However,  below  we  argue  that  reputation  formation  opportunities  may  enable  the 
formation of a stable credit market in the RC even if there are insufficiently many trustworthy 
borrowers to make trading profitable for the lenders in the OC. In other words, even if credit 
market  trading  is  absent  in  the  OC,  the  existence  of  trustworthy  types  may  generate 
reputational incentives which motivate selfish borrowers to repay and make a stable credit 
market possible in the RC. Thus, the possibility for repeated interactions may greatly enhance 
the impact of the presence of trustworthy types, an insight that echoes the theoretical analysis 
in Kreps et al. (1982). 
In  the  following  we  will  explain  why  the  existence  of  reputation  formation 
opportunities makes the situation in the RC very different from the situation in the OC. We 
provide the basic intuition why reputational incentives may imply that not only trustworthy 
borrowers, but also selfish borrowers will choose the efficient project A and repay their debt 
in the RC. The key feature that distinguishes the RC from the OC is that lenders can offer 
credit to the same borrowers in future periods. Because of the finite time horizon a lender is 
                                                 
10 To keep the analysis tractable we assume in this section that there is only heterogeneity with regard to social 
preferences among the borrowers. This is makes sense because there is no moral hazard problem on the lenders’ 
side and we focus exclusively on how the borrowers’ moral hazard problems can be solved. 
11 The existing evidence indicates that the share of people with social preferences is typically below 60%, and 
sometimes even much lower. If we take the upper bound and assume that 60% of borrowers are trustworthy, all 
these borrowers would need to be willing to choose the efficient project and make a repayment of at least 67 
whenever their project turns out to be successful. Given the previous evidence this seems rather unrealistic.   14 
never  willing  to  renew  a  contract  with  a  borrower  who  is  known  to  be  selfish  (see  the 
backward induction argument in Section III.A). A borrower can therefore only benefit from a 
contract renewal, if his current lender has a sufficiently strong belief that her is trustworthy. 
Since  lenders  do  not  observe  project  returns,  the  only  basis  for  assessing  a  borrower’s 
trustworthiness  is  his  repayment  behavior.  Lenders  know  that  trustworthy  borrowers  are 
willing to repay whenever possible, as long as they are offered fair contract terms. If lenders 
offer fair contracts and condition the renewal of their contract in the next period on the current 
repayment, a selfish borrower may, therefore, have an incentive to choose the efficient project 
and repay his debt after project success in the non-final periods.
12 The rationale behind this 
behavior is that it increases his chances to get another attractive credit offer from his current 
lender in the next period. 
Note that while the lenders’ contingent renewals of credit offers provide an incentive 
for selfish borrowers to mimic the trustworthy borrowers’ repayment behavior, no perfect 
pooling  equilibrium  in  which  both  types  of  borrowers  repay  with  certainty  after  project 
success exists. The reason is the following: If all borrowers choose project A and repay with 
probability one after project success, the repayment does not contain any information on the 
borrower's type and accordingly a zero-repayment would always be attributed to a project 
failure. As a  consequence, lenders would have  no reason to condition their offers on the 
borrowers  past  behavior  and  defaulting  would  not  result  in  lower  future  benefits  for 
borrowers.  But  the  absence  of  a  difference  between  future  payoffs  after  repaying  and 
defaulting implies that selfish borrowers would never have any incentives to repay their debt. 
Thus, in equilibrium, selfish borrowers who successfully realize their project only repay with 
a  positive  probability  while  trustworthy  borrowers  with  a  successful  project  repay  with 
certainty (see also Proposition A2 in the Appendix). 
Since selfish borrowers repay with a lower probability than trustworthy borrowers, 
lenders can update their belief about a borrower’s type based on his repayments over time. 
Lenders only extend credit to a borrower, if they have a sufficiently strong belief that he is 
trustworthy. Because trustworthy borrowers repay more often, they are more likely to remain 
creditworthy over time. This implies that within the sample of borrowers who still receive 
credit offers, the fraction of trustworthy borrowers increases over time and lenders adjust their 
beliefs accordingly. Since borrowers with a very  good repayment history are likely to be 
                                                 
12 Intuitively, one might think that choosing project B instead of project A could be attractive for a selfish 
borrower who plans to repay in case of project success. The reason is that project B generates higher expected 
returns in the current period if the borrower plans to repay (see Section III.A for details). However, choosing 
project B also decreases the probability of a project success and therefore the probability of getting the more 
attractive future returns associated with repayment. It is straightforward to show that the decrease in expected 
future returns always outweighs the increase in current expected returns. Thus, whenever reputational incentives 
motivate a borrower to repay, he has also incentives to choose project A (for details see the proof of Proposition 
A2 in the Appendix).   15 
trustworthy, they may even receive credit in the final period, where the lack of reputational 
incentives implies that selfish borrowers default with certainty. 
The  mechanism  described  above  is  based  on  the  existence  of  some  trustworthy 
borrowers and the lenders’ contingent renewal policy which disciplines the selfish borrowers 
in the non-final periods and makes it profitable for the lenders to offer credit. It is important to 
emphasize that this behavior can be sustained in an equilibrium (see Proposition A2 in the 
Appendix for details). However, the described equilibrium is only one among many different 
equilibria. Therefore, theory does not provide a unique prediction. This is a generic feature of 
repeated games in which reputation matters and makes it all the more important to examine 
markets with reputation formation empirically. We believe that the behavior described above 
provides a plausible account of the forces that could be operative in the RC and, therefore, it 
makes sense to search for empirical patterns that match the following conjectures: 
·  The  lenders  in  the  RC  will  condition  incumbents’  credit  renewal  on  their 
repayment behavior. 
·  The borrowers in the RC will repay debt in case of project success with higher 
probability than in the OC. 
·  The borrowers in the RC will choose the efficient project A.  
·  The  disciplining  of  the  selfish  borrowers  will  lead  to  higher  average  debt 
repayments in the RC than the OC and, therefore, trading activity will be higher in 
the RC than in the OC. 
·  The disciplining of the borrowers by the lenders’ contingent renewal policy will 
lead to the formation of long-term trading relations between pairs of traders in the 
RC. 
In the TPC the incentive problem associated with debt repayments is solved through the 
introduction  of  legal  enforcement  of  repayments.  However,  since  the  borrowers’  project 
choice  is  not  observable  for  lenders  the  borrowers  still  have  a  discretionary  leeway.  We 
continue to assume that trustworthy borrowers honor the credit contract and choose project A 
if the contract entails a fair sharing of the project returns. Yet, recall from Section III.A that in 
the TPC selfish borrowers have an incentive to choose the inefficient project B for all contract 
conditions that lenders are willing to offer. However, choosing the inefficient project B also 
decreases the chances of repayment because project B is less likely to be successful. If lenders 
make future credit offers contingent on current debt repayments, they may again generate 
reputational incentives motivating selfish borrowers to choose the efficient project A. As in 
the RC contingent contract renewals may thus also alleviate the moral hazard problem in the 
TPC (see Proposition A3 in the Appendix).    16 
However, perfect pooling, i.e., a situation in which the selfish borrowers perfectly 
mimic the project choices of the trustworthy borrowers, can never be part of an equilibrium. 
The same reasons that prevent a perfect pooling equilibrium with regard to repayment choices 
in the RC also prevent a perfect pooling equilibrium in the TPC. If both types of borrowers 
behaved in exactly the same way, observed repayments would not contain any information on 
project choices and accordingly lenders would have no reason to condition their offers on the 
past repayments of their incumbent borrowers. But in the absence of a conditional offering 
strategy selfish borrowers would lack the incentive to choose the efficient project. Thus, in a 
reputational equilibrium selfish borrowers choose project A with a positive probability but not 
with certainty. This implies that repaying borrowers are more likely to be trustworthy than 
defaulting  ones.  As  a  consequence  the  lenders  who  are  interested  in  interacting  with 
trustworthy borrowers condition their offers on repayment behavior and thereby provide the 
necessary  incentives  for  selfish  borrowers  to  choose  the  efficient  project  (for  details  see 
Proposition A3 in the Appendix). 
Because the contingent renewal equilibrium described above is again only one among 
many equilibria in the TPC the same caveat as in the RC applies, i.e., repeated game theory 
does not provide a perfectly tight prediction. However, this does not mean that the theory is of 
no help because it is still possible to use plausible equilibria as a guide for the empirical 
analysis.  As  the  conditioning  of  credit  offers  on  repayment  behavior  is  a  quite  plausible 
feature of an equilibrium we put forward the following empirical conjectures:  
·  The  lenders  in  the  TPC  will  condition  incumbents’  credit  renewal  on  their 
repayment behavior. 
·  Despite short-term incentives to choose project B many borrowers will choose the 
efficient project A in the TPC.  
·  The disciplining of the borrowers and lenders contingent renewal policy will lead 
to the formation of long-term trading relations between pairs of traders in the TPC. 
Before we present our results it is worthwhile to point out one potentially important 
difference between the RC and the TPC. As we have mentioned above (and show in more 
detail in Proposition A2 in the Appendix), if a selfish borrower has an incentive to repay in 
the  RC  he  is  also  strictly  better  of  if  he  chooses  the  efficient  project.  In  contrast,  in  the 
equilibrium described above for the TPC, the borrower does not face a strict incentive to 
choose project A. In fact, because the borrower’s equilibrium strategy is a mixed strategy he 
must be indifferent between choosing project A and B. Therefore, if the traders in the RC are 
capable  of  enforcing  a  high  repayment  level,  we  would  predict  that we  observe  a  higher 
frequency of efficient project choices in the RC than in the TPC.   17 
Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that we do not think that the participants in 
our experiment will play the described equilibria in a narrow sense. However, we expect the 
forces which support these equilibria – the reputational incentives induced by  conditional 
contract renewals in endogenously built relationships – to importantly shape the nature of 




In this section we present our results. In subsection A we analyze the impact of relational 
reputation formation on credit market performance in the absence of legal enforcement of 
debt repayments. To this end we compare the credit market outcomes in the OC and the RC. 
In subsection B we investigate the consequences of the introduction of legal enforcement of 
debt repayment. This analysis is based on a comparison of the outcomes in the RC and the 
TPC. 
 
A. Reputation and Credit Market Formation 
 
In this section we show that in the OC, where borrowers cannot acquire a reputation, credit 
market trading breaks down. In the RC, in contrast, the possibility for reputation formation 
creates powerful incentives for debt repayment which enables the trading parties to solve the 
double moral hazard problem in the credit market to a high degree and reaching much higher 
levels of market efficiency than in the OC. 
 
Result 1 (market breakdown in the one-shot condition): (a) In the absence of reputation 
formation and third party enforcement of debt  repayment no stable credit market can be 
established  and  trading  sharply  diminishes  over  time.  Despite  the  existence  of  a  non-
negligible share of borrowers who repay credits, lending is not profitable. (b) However, in 
almost all trades that occur the borrowers choose the efficient project A. 
 
Support  for  Result  1  comes  from  Figure  I  and  Figure  II.  Figure  I  shows  that  the  initial 
proportion of realized contracts is very high in the OC – roughly 90% of all feasible trades 
take place. However, there is a sharp decline in market trading already in period 4. After 
period 4 we observe a further gradual decline in the extent to which the available trades are 
exhausted until the frequency of market trading becomes very low. In the final period, only 
17% of the feasible contracts are concluded. Thus, there can be little doubt that the credit 
market essentially breaks down in this condition. 
Insert Figure I about here   18 
Figure II provides the main reason why lenders willingness to offer credit becomes so 
low in the OC. Panel A of Figure II displays the borrowers’ average repayments in concluded 
contracts. In order to evaluate this figure it is important to recall that the lenders’ outside 
option is 32 (depicted by the grey line). The figure clearly indicates that, on average, the 
lenders always earned less than their outside option so that market trading was not worthwhile 
for them. 
However,  the  average  repayment  hides  some  important  heterogeneity  among  the 
borrowers which is displayed in the right panel of Figure II. This figure shows the percentage 
of contracts that were profitable from an ex ante perspective.
13 Overall, roughly 30 percent of 
the contracts were ex ante profitable, making it worthwhile to trade in these cases. Thus, as 
hypothesized, there is a positive share of trustworthy borrowers who repay credits even in the 
OC. As a consequence, lenders did not experience a loss in every trade but could make profits 
in a considerable number of cases. This is likely to be the main reason why it took some time 
for the lenders to realize that their average profit was below their outside option. The lack of 
(average) profitability is also indicated by a regression of lenders’ total payoffs on the number 
of concluded contracts in the OC; for every additional trade a lender earned on average 6 
money  units  less  (coefficient  =  -6.04,  p  =  0.079,  robust  standard  errors  clustered  on 
sessions).
14 
Insert Figure II about here 
The project choice data reveal that the borrowers choose project A in 94% of the 
cases. This is interesting because it is consistent with our assumption about the coexistence of 
selfish and trustworthy types (see Section III.B). If a borrower is selfish and plans not to repay 
his or her credit, then the borrower is the residual claimant of all returns. This implies that 
selfish borrowers should choose project A, because this maximizes their expected returns. If a 
borrower is trustworthy, he or she may voluntarily want to stick to the credit terms set by the 
lender. As most lenders (85%) choose project A as the desired project in their contract offer, 
this implies that also trustworthy borrowers should mostly choose project A. 
Results 1 sets the stage for studying the impact of reputation formation opportunities 
on credit market functioning. It shows that the existence of selfish borrowers who do not 
                                                 
13 There are two cases in which the contract is profitable to the lender from an ex ante perspective (i.e., extending 
credit creates an expected profit of at least 32). The first case is that the borrower chooses project A and repays 
at least 40 in case of success (Expected profit = 0.8 x 40 = 32). The second case is that the borrower chooses 
project B and repays at least 107 (Expected profit = 0.3 x 107 » 32). The analysis is based on data from contracts 
with successful projects only. The reason is that in case of project failures we do not observe how much the 
borrower would have repaid if the project had been successful. However, since project success is randomly 
determined, this procedure does not bias our results. 
14  Since  observations  within  a  session  cannot  be  regarded  as  independent,  the  standard  errors  of  all  our 
regressions are clustered at the session level. For the non-parametric statistical tests (like the Mann Whitney test) 
we take session averages as the unit of observation.   19 
repay their debt undermines the credit market but it also indicates the potential of reputation 
formation to stabilize credit market trading even in finitely repeated interactions because there 
is a significant share of trustworthy borrowers who repay their debt in case of project success. 
Our next result shows that reputation opportunities have indeed a powerful effect.   
 
Result  2  (reputation  generates  stable  market  trading):  The  introduction  of  reputation 
formation opportunities allows for the formation of a stable credit market such that, except 
for the final period, roughly 80-90% of the feasible trades take place. 
 
Support for Result 2 comes from Figure I and the associated statistical tests. Figure I indicates 
that in each of the first 19 periods of the RC at least 74 percent of the available trades take 
place  and  if  we  take  the  average  over  all  20  periods,  we  observe  that  81  percent  of  the 
available contracts are concluded. This result contrasts sharply with the OC. The contrast with 
the OC is most visible in periods 15-19 where the gap in the share of realized contracts is 
roughly 50 percentage points. Thus, Figure I illustrates that the introduction of the opportunity 
to form long-term relationships substantially improves the stability of credit market trading. 
We find that the number of realized contracts is slightly decreasing over time and abruptly 
drops from 72 to 42 percent in the last period. 
The large gap in trading activity between the RC and the OC is also confirmed by 
more  formal  statistical  tests.  The  non-parametric  Mann  Whitney  test  with  the  number  of 
contracts  per  session  as  the  unit  of  observation  indicates  highly  significant  treatment 
differences (p = 0.004). 
The much higher trading activity in the RC indicates that reputation formation makes 
the extension of credit more attractive. Thus, the natural next question is: how exactly do 
trading parties succeed in mitigating the moral hazard problems in the RC?  
 
Result 3 (endogenous enforcement of credit contracts in the RC): If reputation formation 
is possible lenders condition contract renewal on the borrower’s past repayment behavior. As 
a consequence, borrowers have a strong incentive to repay their debt after the successful 
realization of a project. In addition, in the vast majority of trades the borrowers choose the 
efficient project A. As a consequence, the average repayment in the RC is significantly higher 
than in the OC.  
 
We provide support for Result 3 with Table II and Figure III. Regressions 1 and 2 in Table II 
show  the  results  of  probit  regressions  in  which  we  regress  the  binary  variable  "contract 
renewal in the next period" on the current repayment, the average repayment in previous   20 
interactions  with  the  same  lender  and  the  number  of  previous  interactions  with  the  same 
lender.  The  ME-columns  associated  with  these  regressions  indicate  the  corresponding 
marginal  effects.  In  the  third  and  fourth  regression  we  do  not  use  repayment  levels  as 
regressors; instead, we regress on a dummy for positive repayments in the current period and 
the percentage of positive repayments in previous interactions with the same lender. Table II 
shows that all coefficients in all regressions are positive and significant. The marginal effect 
for the repayment levels in columns ME[1] and ME[2] indicate that a repayment increase by 
10 units in the current period increases the probability of contract renewal in the next period 
by 11 percent; an increase in the average repayment in all previous interactions with the 
current  lender  by  10  units  increases  the  probability  of  contract  renewal  by  4  percent. 
However,  an  even  more  impressive  marginal  effect  is  indicated  by  columns  ME[3]  and 
ME[4].  A  borrower  who  makes  a  positive  repayment  increases  the  chances  of  contract 
renewal by 48%. On average lenders renew a contract with a borrower in 66% of the cases if 
he makes a positive repayment, but only in 18% of the cases if he does not repay.
15 One 
reason  for  this  big  effect  is  that  if  the  borrowers  decided  to  repay  they  usually  repaid  a 
substantial amount, making the trade profitable for the lender. If we only look at positive 
repayments 90 percent of all observations lie in the interval [40, 60]. This makes perfect sense 
in light of our argument that borrowers who repay their debt are either reciprocally motivated 
and prepared to comply with the conditions proposed by the lender or they pretend to have 
such preferences.
16 The borrowers almost never make repayments between 0 and 40, as this 
would reveal that they have successfully realized a project but are not willing to comply with 
the terms requested by the lender. Because of this discontinuity in the amount of repayment 
there is a sharp increase in the probability of contract renewal if there is a positive repayment. 
Insert Table II about here 
The conditioning of contract renewal on past repayment behavior is in line with our 
predictions in Section III.B. This policy by the lenders generates incentives for the borrowers 
for repaying substantial amounts. This can be illustrated by examining how the borrowers’ 
total  payoff  is  related  to  his  average  repayment  in  all  concluded  contracts.  If  we  regress 
individual borrowers’ total payoffs on their average repayments we find that an increase in the 
average repayment causes a significant increase in the borrowers’ payoff (coefficient = 4.61, p 
= 0.064, robust standard errors). 
                                                 
15 Note that it is not unreasonable to renew a borrower’s contract even if he fails to repay a positive amount in 
the current period because even the efficient project A can fail so that lack of repayment does not necessarily 
imply a lack of willingness to repay. 
16 A closer look at the desired repayments in all accepted contracts reveals, that a repayment in the interval [40, 
60] can in the majority of the cases be interpreted as a compliance with the contract terms. In 65 percent of the 
cases  the  lender's  desired  repayments  are  in  the  interval  [40,  60].  In  the  remaining  35  percent  the  desired 
repayments are higher. However, desired repayments above 70 are very rare.   21 
The  lenders’  contract  renewal  policy  may  affect  the  borrowers’  behavior  in  two 
dimensions:  the  project  choice  and  the  repayment  after  project  success.  Since  the  former 
choice determines the probability with which the borrower can make a positive repayment, it 
is the combination of the two that determines the profitability of credit contracts to lenders. In 
Section III.B we predicted that reputational incentives, that are strong enough to motivate the 
borrowers to make positive repayments after project success, also induce the borrower to 
choose the efficient project A. The reason is that the short-term gains that a borrower who 
plans  to  make  a  positive  repayment  can  deduce  from  choosing  the  risky  project,  are 
dominated by the implied loss in the expected continuation payoffs. Interestingly, we find that 
this prediction is borne out by the data. The contract renewal policy of the lenders not only 
motivates the borrowers to make positive repayments, but it does also not significantly lower 
the frequency of project A choices relative to the OC. While project A is observed in 94% of 
the cases in the OC, project A is still chosen in 91% of the cases in the RC. This finding is 
also crucial for the efficiency effects of the reputational incentives in the RC. Together, the 
increase in the number of trades and the high frequency of efficient project choices imply that 
the realized fraction of the available gains from trade increases from 46% in the OC to 66% in 
the  RC.  A  one-sided  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  test  with  the  actual  gains  from  trade  per 
session as the unit of observation reveals that this difference is statistically significant (p = 
0.047).
17 
The impact of the conditional contract renewals on the borrowers’ repayment behavior 
in  the  RC  is  depicted  in  Panel  A  of  Figure  III.  In  this  figure,  we  display  borrowers’ 
repayments after a project success in the OC and the RC. The figure shows that repayments 
are considerably higher in the RC than in the OC. A one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
with session averages as observations shows that the difference in repayments after project 
success is statistically significant (p = 0.004).  
Panel A of Figure III also shows that the repayments after project success decline 
strongly in the final two periods of the RC. This evidence suggests that selfish borrowers are 
no  longer  disciplined  by  reputation  incentives  towards  the  end  of  the  experiment. 
Furthermore, the borrowers’ repayment behavior in the last two periods also explains the end-
game effect in the number of realized contracts (see Figure I). It is evident that there is a good 
reason  for  lenders  to  back  away  from  the  credit  market  near  the  end  of  the  experiment, 
                                                 
17 Note that the actual gains from trade contain a substantial element of randomness because of the randomness 
involved in project success. Therefore, the p-values are somewhat lower for the actual gains from trade. We also 
ran a number of regressions with the realized number of trades and the actual gains from trade as the dependent 
variable, a treatment dummy for RC and various dummy variables for different time intervals and interactions 
between  time  intervals  and  the  treatment  dummy.  All  regressions  show  a  clear  picture:  the  RC  treatment 
significantly increases the number of trades and the gains from trade relative to the OC.   22 
because many of the selfish borrowers who repaid out of reputational concerns now simply 
maximize their short-term profits and keep the whole project returns to themselves. 
Insert Figure III about here 
Even  more  direct  evidence  for  the  presence  of  a  strong  disciplining  effect  for  the 
selfish borrowers comes from Panel B of Figure III. In this figure we show for every borrower 
the  frequency  of  positive  repayments  during  periods  1-18  together  with  the  frequency  of 
positive repayments in period 19-20. The larger the size of a bubble the more individuals are 
represented  by  the  bubble.  The  figure  indicates  that  there  are  a  considerable  number  of 
individuals who repay their debt in more than 70% of the cases in periods 1-18 but pay back 
nothing  in  periods  19-20.  This  pattern  neatly  documents  the  disciplining  of  the  selfish 
subjects. However, the figure also shows that there is a non-negligible number of inherently 
trustworthy individuals who repay positive amounts even in periods 19-20. 
As  our  next  result  shows,  the  alleviation  of  the  moral  hazard  problems  through 
contract  renewal  for  reputable  borrowers  also  leads  to  a  fundamental  change  in  market 
interactions because borrowers and lenders interact repeatedly with each other.  
 
Result 4 (long-term relations dominate market trading): In the RC the majority of trades 
is concluded by pairs who trade at least five times with each other and trading partners who 
interact  repeatedly  with  each  other  earn  significantly  more  than  those  who  change  their 
partner frequently. 
 
Support for Result 4 comes from Figure IV which displays the cumulative frequency of trades 
concluded by pairs in repeated interactions with a varying number of periods. As a bechmark 
we also show the data for the OC because there the traders could not choose their trading 
partners and did not know if they happened to be matched with the same trader repeatedly. 
Thus, the difference between the OC and the RC shows the extent to which the traders in the 
RC deliberately engaged in repeated interactions (as compared with only coincidental multi-
period  trading  in  the  OC).  The  large  difference  between  the  conditions  indicates  that  the 
participants in the RC successfully formed trading relations. In fact, in the RC the majority of 
trades are concluded by pairs who interact at least five times with each other. 
Insert Figure IV about here 
If it is true that the lenders’ conditional renewal policy disciplines the borrowers and 
leads to higher repayments then we should also observe that borrowers who often interact 
with the same lender choose the efficient project A more frequently and repay on average 
higher  amounts.  To  examine  this  question  we  constructed  Figure  V  which  displays  the   23 
percentage of efficient projects chosen in realized contracts and the average repayments after 
a projects success conditional on the number of interactions in the same pair. The figure 
indicates that more frequent interactions are indeed associated with a higher frequency of 
efficient project choices and higher average repayments. Thus, all the facts support the view 
that  reputation  formation  opportunities  and  the  associated  constraints  on  the  borrowers’ 
behavior greatly alleviate the double moral hazard problem inherent in our credit market.  
Insert Figure V about here 
In order to examine how the involvement in repeated interactions affects lenders’ and 
borrowers’  profits  we  measure  the  extent  to  which  each  individual  has  succeeded  in 
establishing relationships. The simplest possible measure would be the maximal number of 
interactions with the same trading partner. However, this is a very crude measure that ignores 
the possibility that some participants may establish relations with more than one partner over 
the duration of the experiment. Therefore we use a slightly more complex indicator which we 
call the intensity of repeated interactions (IRI). By using the IRI, we take an individual’s full 




i i T =   ∑  , where Ti is the number of trades with trading partner i and n is the number of 
potential trading partners (n=10 for lenders and n=7 for borrowers). The IRI is maximal if a 
market participant interacts with the same trading partner in all 20 periods (IRI = 1) and 
minimal if a market participant always chooses his outside-option (IRI = 0). In between these 
two extreme cases the IRI is the higher, the more a market participant succeeds in repeatedly 
interacting with trading partners.  
The IRI enables us to answer the question whether traders with a higher IRI earn on 
average higher profits. If we regress individual traders’ average profits per period on their 
IRI’s we find that both lenders’ and borrowers’ IRI is significantly and positively correlated 
with their profits (lenders: coefficient = 13.25, p = 0.004, robust standard errors clustered on 
session level; borrowers: coefficient = 20.15, p = 0.008, robust standard errors clustered on 
session  level).  Thus,  the  more  a  trader  succeeded  in  establishing  long  term  relations,  the 
higher  their  profits.  This  result  is  particularly  remarkable  for  the  borrowers’  because  the 
establishment of a trading relationship was only possible if the borrower’s repayments were 
sufficiently high. Thus, the positive impact of the IRI on the borrowers’ profits is a further 
indication that it was profitable for the borrowers in the RC to repay their debt. 
 
B. Reputation and Third Party Enforcement of Repayments 
 
In the previous section we have seen that reputation formation opportunities go a long way 
towards solving the double moral hazard problem in our credit market. In this section we   24 
examine  how  credit  markets  are  affected  if  one  of  the  two  moral  hazard  problems  –  the 
repayment  problem  –  is  solved  by  legal  enforcement.  A  first  intuition  might  lead  one  to 
believe  that  if  only  the  project  choice  problem  remains,  it  might  be  easier  to  solve  this 
problem  with  reputational  incentives.  However,  as  we  have  seen  in  Section  III.B,  the 
introduction of third party enforcement might exacerbate the project choice problem. Our next 
result shows that this is indeed the case.  
 
Result  5  (market  trading  and  project  choice  under  third  party  enforcement):  The 
introduction  of  third  party  enforcement  of  debt  repayment  causes  a  further  significant 
increase in the number of trades but it also leads to a significant reduction in the share of 
efficient projects so that the efficiency gains from third party enforcement are relatively small.  
 
We provide support for the first part of Result 5 by means of Figure II. This figure indicates 
that in almost all periods the share of realized contracts is higher in the third party condition 
(TPC) than in the RC. This difference is also statistically significant according to a Mann 
Whitney test with session averages as the unit of observation (p = 0.008)
18. However, the 
realized gains from trade are only somewhat higher in the TPC compared to the RC – 72% in 
the TPC and 66% in the RC. Moreover, this difference is not statistically significant (Mann 
Whitney test with session averages as unit of observations, p = 0.247). 
If efficiency does not increase although the number of trades is significantly higher in 
the TPC, project choices must differ across conditions. Our theoretical analysis in Section 
III.B (see page 15) suggests that borrowers may face weaker incentives to choose project A in 
the TPC than in the RC. And indeed, in more than half of the trades (54%) the borrowers 
choose the inefficient project B in the TPC while in the RC the borrowers choose project B in 
only 9% of the cases. This difference is highly significant (Mann Whitney test with session 
averages as unit of observations, p = 0.004). 
One important reasons why the borrowers choose the inefficient project much more 
often in the TPC than in the RC is that the borrowers in the TPC face much stronger short-
term incentives to choose project B. Due to the legal enforceability of debt repayments, the 
choice of project B always maximized the borrowers’ period profit in the TPC. In the RC, in 
contrast, this was not the case. Despite the fact that reputational forces greatly alleviated the 
repayment problem in the RC, borrowers did still not repay anything in 17.5% percent of the 
successful projects. In these 17.5 % of the cases, the borrower had the incentive to choose the 
                                                 
18 We also ran several regressions with the realized number of trades as the dependent variable, a treatment 
dummy for RC and various dummy variables for different time intervals and interactions between time intervals 
and the treatment dummy. All these regressions reveal the same picture: the TPC significantly increases the 
number of trades.   25 
efficient project A because he earned the whole project return. Furthermore, lenders in the 
TPC requested much higher repayments in case of a project success than in the RC which 
increases the short term incentive to choose project B. Thus, even in the cases where they 
planned to make the repayment requested by the lender, borrowers in the RC had less strong 
incentives to choose project B than the borrowers in the TPC. In Table III we show how much 
borrowers can gain if they choose project B although the lender asks for project A in the RC 
and  the  TPC.  The  table  illustrates  that  the  difference  in  the  borrowers’  expected  profits 
between  project  A  and  B  differs  substantially  across  conditions.  The  relative  short  term 
attractiveness of project B – as measured by the expected profit of project B relative to project 
A – is considerably higher in the TPC than in the RC. 
Insert Table III about here 
Table  III  is  based  on  data  from  contracts  in  which  the  lender’s  desired  project  is 
project A. The table displays expected period profits of borrowers for each possible project 
choice.
19 In trades carried out by a lender and a borrower who interact infrequently with each 
other (1-3 times over the experiment) choosing project A yields a slightly higher expected 
profit for the borrower in the RC while project B yields a much higher expected profit in the 
TPC. If a pair of traders interacted repeatedly with each other (between 4 and 10 times or 
between 11 and 20 times, respectively) project B yields higher expected payoffs for borrowers 
both in the RC and the TPC. However, the difference in expected profits between the two 
projects  is  much  larger  in  the  TPC,  indicating  that  borrowers  have  a  stronger  short-term 
incentive  to  choose  project  B  in  the  TPC  than  in  the  RC.  Thus,  for  given  reputational 
incentives (arising from contingent contract renewals) the borrowers have stronger incentives 
to choose the inefficient project B in the TPC. 
The fact that the introduction of third party enforcement exacerbates the project choice 
problem implies that the provision of reputational incentives may still be of high value in the 
TPC. Since a borrower can increase the probability of repayment by choosing the efficient 
project,  the  lenders  can  provide  reputational  incentives  to  choose  project  A  by  making 
contract renewals dependent on past repayment behavior. Our next result addresses, therefore, 
                                                 
19 In the TPC the fact that desired repayments are enforceable makes it easy to calculate borrowers’ expected 
profits. The database consists of all concluded contracts in which the lender desired project A. Expected profits 
are calculated as: Expected profit = Probability of success x (Project return – Desired repayment). In the RC, in 
contrast, the desired repayment is not binding and the borrower can repay as much as he wants. In this case the 
data base consists of all accepted contracts in which the lender desired project A and the borrower successfully 
completed a project (either A or B). Expected profits are calculated as: Expected profit = Probability of success x 
(Project return - Observed repayment). We can only consider contracts with successful projects because intended 
repayments are not observable in case of project failure. As project success is random, this does not bias our 
results. Our calculations for the RC implicitly assume that borrowers would have made the same repayment, if 
they had chosen the other project. The data support this assumption: the borrower’s actual project choice does 
not significantly affect the repayment level in contracts in which the lender desired project A. This makes sense, 
if we take into account that borrowers have always incentives to pretend that they have chosen project A.   26 
the question whether borrowers face such reputational incentives in the TPC and how strong 
they are in comparison to the RC  
 
Result  6  (endogenous  enforcement  of  efficient  project  choices):  Under  third  party 
enforcement of repayments the lenders condition contract renewal on the borrower’s past 
repayment behavior but the impact of past repayments on contract renewal is weaker than in 
the RC. Nevertheless, contingent contract renewal also leads to repeated interactions between 
borrowers and lenders in the TPC.  
 
Result 6 means that the borrowers in the TPC do not only face stronger short-term incentives 
to choose the inefficient project but they also face weaker reputational incentives to choose 
the efficient project A. Taken together these facts provide a plausible explanation for why we 
observe much fewer efficient project choices in the TPC. 
Support for Result 6 comes from Table IV which shows probit regressions with data 
from the TPC and the RC in which the binary variable “contract renewal in the next period” is 
the dependent variable. Regressions 1 and 2 compare the impact of the current repayment, the 
average repayment in previous interactions with the same lender and the number of previous 
interactions with the same lender on the probability of a contract renewal in the next period. 
The  corresponding  ME-columns  report  the  marginal  effects.
20  The  significantly  negative 
interaction effect of the TP dummy and the current repayment level (see columns ME[1] and 
ME[2])  indicates  that  the  current  repayment  level  has  a  weaker  positive  impact  on  the 
probability of contract renewal in the next period. Regressions 3 and 4 confirm this finding 
with a different set of right-hand side variables. Instead of current and past repayment levels 
we use a dummy for positive current repayments and the percentage of positive repayments in 
previous interactions as regressors. In both regressions the interaction between the dummy for 
positive repayments and the TPC dummy is negative, significant and sizeable. This result 
means a positive repayment in the TPC did not increase a borrower’s chances of a contract 
renewal in the same way as in the RC: a positive repayment in period t increases the chances 
of a contract renewal in the TPC by about 10 to 13 percentage points less than in the RC. This 
implies that that there are less strong incentives to choose the low risk project A in the TPC 
than in the RC. 
Insert Table IV about here 
                                                 
20 Since the interaction effect does not correspond to the marginal effect of the interaction term in non-linear 
estimations, we used the procedure recommended by Ai and Norton (2003) to estimate the correct interaction 
effects.   27 
Yet, despite this decrease in contingency of contract renewals the borrowers in the 
TPC still face reputational incentives. A positive repayment increases the probability of a 
contract renewal by about 30 percentage points (see columns ME[3] and ME[4]). That these 
incentives have important consequences for the prevalence of repeated interactions in the TPC 
is illustrated by the fact that the cumulative frequency of trades in the TPC – which is shown 
in Figure VI – resembles the one in the RC: a substantial share of the trades is executed by 
trader pairs that interact many times with each other. 
Insert Figure VI about here 
The  lower  degree  of  contingency  in  contract  renewals  also  does  not  mean  that 
contingent contract renewal did not have an effect on project choices and average repayments. 
Figure VII shows that in relations lasting more than 10 periods project A was chosen in more 
than 70 percent of the cases and the average repayments were therefore, rather high. Yet, in 
relations that lasted less than 10 periods the efficient project is only chosen in less than 40% 
of the cases. As a consequence, borrowers and lenders benefited from the establishment of 
long-term relations: if we regress profits on the intensity of repeated interactions (IRI) in the 
TPC  we  observe  that  a  higher  IRI  is  associated  with  higher  profits  for  both  lenders  and 
borrowers (lenders: coefficient = 14.42, p = 0.006, robust standard errors clustered on session 
level; borrowers: coefficient = 24.51, p = 0.021, robust standard errors clustered on session 
level). 




In this paper we experimentally investigate how reputation formation in endogenously built 
relationships affects credit market performance and how these relational incentives interact 
with improvements in the legal enforceability of debt repayments. When legal institutions are 
weak and repayments cannot be exogenously enforced we find that the disciplining effect of 
relational  incentives  is  a  decisive  determinant  for  the  existence  and  functioning  of  credit 
markets. In the condition where reputation formation opportunities are exogenously excluded 
the lack of repayment incentives leads to a breakdown of credit market activity. However, 
when we allow that borrowers can acquire a reputation, stable credit markets emerge in which 
roughly 80% of all feasible trades take place. By conditioning access to future credits on 
previous debt repayments, lenders create powerful incentives for borrowers to repay their debt 
out of reputational  concerns.  Borrowers respond to these incentives by  choosing efficient 
projects and a high repayment rate. As a consequence, many mutually beneficial trades take 
place.   28 
This  finding  is  interesting  with  regard  to  the  literature  on  relationship  banking. 
Theoretically,  it  has  often  been  argued  that  the  prevalence  of  bilateral  borrower-lender 
relationships may be due to the disciplining effect of contingent contract renewals. However, 
so  far  existing  field  data  has  not  allowed  separating  this  effect  from  the  alternative 
explanation that relationships are attractive because they provide lenders with better access to 
the borrower’s books and therewith lead to the selection of better borrowers. Our experiment 
enables us to show the positive impact of the disciplining effect on credit market performance 
in a clean and controlled way. 
When  the  legal  credit  market  environment  improves,  we  observe  an  interesting 
interaction  effect  between  relational  incentives  and  the  exogenous  enforcement  of  debt 
repayments. While the legal enforceability of debt repayment causes a significant increase in 
credit market trading, it has only a small positive impact on credit market efficiency. The 
reason is that in the presence of limited liability and wealth constraints the legal enforcement 
of  debt  repayments  motivates  many  borrowers  to  choose  inefficiently  risky  projects. 
Endogenous contract enforcement in relationships does only partly offset this effect. Thus, 
legal  enforcement  provides  not  only  a  powerful  solution  to  the  moral  hazard  problem 
associated  with  debt  repayment,  but  it  also  exacerbates  the  moral  hazard  problem  that  is 
associated with the incentive to choose inefficient high risk projects. 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  the  possibility  that  legal  enforcement  weakens 
reputational incentives and increases the frequency of inefficient project choices has not been 
discussed before. Our finding that legal and endogenous enforcement mechanisms may have 
important interactions suggests that these effects should be studied more extensively in future 
work.   29 
Appendix 
In this appendix we show the existence of reputation equilibria in a two-period version of the 
game implemented in our experiment. It is not our objective to provide a complete formal 
analysis of our experimental game. We rather want to show that in the RC and the TPC there 
are perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the reputation mechanisms intuitively described in 
Section III.B are at work. 
As outlined in the text, we assume that there are two types of borrowers: A share x Î 
(0,1) are trustworthy types, i.e. they are willing to honor the credit terms set by the lender as 
long  as  they  perceive  them  as  fair.  The  rest  of  the  borrowers  are  purely  selfish  profit-
maximizers. We assume that the trustworthy borrowers perceive a credit offer as fair if the 
lender asks for the efficient project and if the desired repayment r
d ensures that the return in 
case of project success is shared in a fair manner, i.e. a fair contract offer must be of the form 
(p
d = A, r
d ≤ r
t), where r
t is the maximal repayment a trustworthy borrower considers as fair.
21 
For tractability reason we slightly simplify the posting and acceptance of credit offers. 
In the experiment the trading mechanism is a continuous auction. However, as continuous 
auctions have defied a fully rigorous analysis so far, we approximate the bargaining process 
with a posted contract mechanism. Specifically, we assume that each lender can only make 
one credit offer, either a public offer or a private offer in every period. Borrowers then choose 
in random order from the available offers. Each borrower is free to accept one of the loans 
available to him or not to borrow at all. 
A. Credit Market Trading in the OC 
We  first  analyze  the  behavior  of  risk-neutral  lenders  and  borrowers  in  the  OC,  in  which 
neither legal enforcement of debt repayments nor the possibility for reputation formation are 
present. Proposition A1 shows that in the OC credit market trading can only take place if there 
is a sufficiently large share of trustworthy borrowers. 
Proposition A1: 
In the OC lenders are only willing to offer credit contracts to borrowers if the fraction of 
trustworthy borrowers satisfies x ³ k / (w
Ar
t), otherwise lenders make use of the endowment-
storing technology. 
                                                 
21 It is plausible that r
t depends on the presence of legal enforcement of debt repayments. As the presence of third 
party enforceability of repayments puts lenders into a stronger position trustworthy borrowers may be prepared 
to regard higher repayment requests as fair when repayments are enforceable than when they are not. To keep 
our exposition as simple as possible, we do not explicitly include this possibility in our notation.   30 
Proof: 
In the OC selfish borrowers simply maximize their period profits, i.e., they choose project A 
and never repay after project success. Trustworthy borrowers, in contrast, are willing to honor 
the contract terms if they are offered a contract of the form (p
d = A, r
d ≤ r
t). If a lenders offer 
such a contract to a borrower of unknown type, his expected profit is E[pL] = xw
Ar
d. Since the 
lender’s expected profit is increasing in r
d it is profit-maximizing to set r
d = r
t. As a lender can 
always  realize  a  profit  of  k  by  choosing  the  endowment-storing  technology,  he  is  only 
prepared to offer a credit contract to an unknown borrower if the following offer condition is 
satisfied x ³ k / (w
Ar
t).  n 
B. Credit Market Trading in the RC 
We next consider the RC. For simplicity and expositional clarity we consider only a two-
period  version  of  the  game.  In  line  with  our  empirical  observations  in  the  laboratory  we 
assume  that  the  fraction  of  trustworthy  borrowers  is  insufficient  to  make  credit  contracts 
profitable in the OC, i.e., x < k / (w
Ar
t). Proposition A2 shows that in the RC reputation effects 
make it possible that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which lenders are willing to 
extend credit even if the parameters are such that no credit market can exists in the OC. 
Proposition A2: 
Consider the RC and assume that the fraction of trustworthy borrowers lies in the following 
range: [k / (w
Ar
t)]
2 £ x < k / (w
Ar
t). There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following 
characteristics: In period 1 all lenders make a public credit offer of the form (p
d = A, r
d = r
t). 
A random selection of 7 borrowers accepts these offers and chooses project A. In case of 
project success trustworthy borrowers repay r = r
t with certainty, while selfish borrowers 
repay r = r
t with probability s = x (w
Ar
t – k) / [(1 – x)k]. In period 2 each lender whose 
incumbent borrower has repaid the loan in period 1 privately offers a credit contract of the 
form (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) with probability l = r
t / (w
AR
A – b) to his incumbent borrower, while 
each  lender  whose  incumbent  borrower  has  defaulted  in  period  1  always  chooses  the 
endowment-storing technology. Those borrowers who get a credit offer choose project A. In 
case  of  project  success  trustworthy  borrowers  repay  r  =  r
t  with  certainty  while  selfish 
borrowers never repay. 
Proof: 
Proof is by construction and is established in three steps: 
Step 1 (project choice and repayments of trustworthy borrowers):   31 
We have assumed that trustworthy borrowers who get a contract of the form (p
d = A, r
d ≤ r
t) 
honor the contract terms suggested by the lender if possible. Thus, all trustworthy borrowers 
who succeed in accepting a contract (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) in period 1 and 2 choose project A and 
repay after project success. 
Step 2 (project choice and repayments of selfish borrowers): 
Since period 2 is the final period selfish borrowers behave exactly as in the OC: whenever 
they succeed in getting a contract they maximize their period profit by choosing project A and 
not repaying in case of project success. Thus, if a selfish borrower gets a contract in period 2, 
his expected profit is E[pB] = w
AR
A. 
In period 1 the situation is different. Let us start with the repayment decision. Assume 
that a selfish borrower has accepted a contract (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) and has successfully realized a 
project (it may be A or B). The borrower must now choose one of two repayments: Either he 
imitates the behavior of a trustworthy borrower and repays (r = r
t) or he does not repay at all 
(r  =  0).
22  In  period  1  repaying  may  make  sense  if  lenders  condition  the  probability  of  a 
contract  renewal  in  period  2  on  the  borrower’s  repayment  behavior.  Define  l(r)  as  the 
probability  with  which  a  lender  renews  his  contract  with  a  borrower  in  period  2  after 
observing the repayment r in period 1. After repaying r in period 1 a selfish borrower then 
faces the following continuation payoff for period 2: V(r) = l(r)w
AR
A  + (1 – l(r))b. This 
implies  that  a  selfish  borrower  is  willing  to  make  a  repayment  r  =  r
t  if  the  following 
repayment condition is satisfied: r
t £ V(r
t) – V(0) = (l(r
t) – l(0))(w
AR
A – b). 
Let us now move on to the project choice. Using the notation from above, we can 
write the expected stream of utility over both periods, which is implied by the choice of a 




t)) + (1 – s)(R
A + V(0))] + (1 – w
p)V(0). 
Thus, a selfish borrower prefers project A over project B as long as the following project 















B, it is straightforward to see that the repayment condition is a sufficient (but 
not necessary) condition for the project choice condition. 
The lenders’ contract renewal probabilities given in Proposition A2 imply that the 
repayment condition is satisfied with equality, i.e., a selfish borrower is indifferent between 
repaying  and  not  repaying  after  the  realization  of  a  successful  project  in  period  1. 
                                                 
22 A positive repayment r < r
t is never optimal. Such a repayment is not in line with a trustworthy borrower’s 
behavior and would therefore reveal the selfish borrower’s type. However, if the borrower reveals his type 
anyway, then he is always better off by repaying nothing.   32 
Accordingly, any repayment probability s Î [0,1] is optimal. Furthermore, the fact that the 
repayment condition is satisfied implies that also the project choice condition is satisfied. 
Step 3: Sequential Rationality and Credit Contract Offers of Lenders 
Sequential rationality requires that a lender’s belief y about the trustworthiness of a borrower 
is defined at every information structure in the game. The initial prior, that is the probability 
that a lender assigns to the event that an unknown borrower is trustworthy, is given by the 
population fraction of trustworthy borrowers: y(Æ) = x. If a lender interacts with a borrower in 
period  1  he  updates  his  belief  about  the  trustworthiness  of  this  borrower  based  on  the 
observed repayment using Bayes’ Rule. Accordingly, the lender’s belief after a repayment of 
r = r
t is given by y(r
t) = x / [x + (1 – x)s], while the lender’s belief after default (r = 0) is given 
by y(0) = (1 – wA)x / [(1 – wA) + wA(1 – x)(1 – s)]. 
  Let us now turn to the credit offers of lenders.  In period 2 lenders anticipate that 
borrowers face the same incentives as in the OC. Accordingly, Proposition A1 implies that a 
lender is only willing to make a credit offer to a specific borrower if his belief satisfies the 
offer condition: y > k / (w
Ar
t). Since we assume that x < k / (w
Ar
t) (no credit market trading in 
OC) a borrower who does not repay in period 1 does not get a credit offer in period 2. The 
reason is that the lender’s belief cannot satisfy the offer condition: y(0) £ x < k / (w
Ar
t). This 
implies that the contract renewal probability after default is zero: l(0) = 0. 
  In  order  to  get  a  credit  offer  after  repaying  in  period  1  the  selfish  borrower's 
repayment  probability  has  to  be  low  enough  such  that  the  lender's  updated  belief  at  the 
beginning of period 2 has at least increased to the necessary threshold value: y(r
t) ³ k / (w
Ar
t). 
This  yields  the  following  condition  for  the  selfish  borrower’s  repayment  probability:  s  £ 
x(w
Ar
t – k) / (1 – x)k < 1. Given that l(0) = 0 the repayment condition from Step 2 implies that 
this repayment probability can only be best response of a selfish borrower if the lender’s 




A – b). However, this 
contract renewal probability can only be a best a  response of the lender, if the lender is 
indifferent  between  offering  a  contract  and  choosing  the  endowment-storing  technology. 
Accordingly, the lender’s belief must be exactly at the threshold level, i.e., y(r
t) = k / (w
Ar
t). 
This, in turn, implies that s = x(w
Ar
t – k) / (1 – x)k. Furthermore, in period 1 lenders are only 
willing to offer a contract if the total probability of getting a repayment ensures that they are 
at least indifferent between offering a contract and their outside-option. This requires that x + 
(1 – x)s = k / (w
Ar
t). Given the repayment behavior of selfish borrowers in period 1 this   33 
condition can only be satisfied if the initial fraction of trustworthy borrowers is not too low: x 
³ [k / (w
Ar
t)]
2.  n 
C. Credit Market Trading in the TPC 
We now turn to the TPC, in which repayments of borrowers after project success are legally 
enforced. In Section III.A we show that in this setup maximization of short-term borrower 
profits requires the  choice of project B.  In the  absence of trustworthy  borrowers, lenders 





s = (wBRB – b) / wB is a high repayment which makes the borrower only 
slightly  better  off  than  his  outside  option.
23  If  there  is  a  large  fraction  of  trustworthy 
borrowers, lenders may – even in the absence of reputational incentives – prefer to offer a 
contract of the form (p
d = A, r
d = r
t). However, we assume that the fraction of trustworthy 
borrowers is not large enough to render such a contract profitable in a one-shot interaction, 







24 Proposition A3 shows that in the TPC reputation effects 
make it possible that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which lenders offer contracts 
of the form (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) despite the fact that the parameters are such that these contracts 
are not profitable in one-shot interactions. 
Proposition A3: 

















t. There is a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium with the following characteristics: In period 1 all lenders make a public 
credit offer of the form (p
d = A, r
d = r
t). A random selection of 7 borrowers accepts these 
offers. Trustworthy borrowers who have accepted a contract choose project A with certainty, 















t)]. In period 2 each 
lender, whose borrower has repaid in period 1, privately offers a credit contract of the form 
(p
d = A, r
d = r











t) – b)] 
to his incumbent borrower, while each lender whose incumbent borrower has defaulted in 
period 1 always makes a public credit offer of the form (p
d = B, r
d = r
s) to his incumbent 
borrower. Trustworthy borrower choose project A if they receive a contract offer of the form 
(p
d = A, r
d = r
t) and project B if they receive a contract offer (p
d =  B, r
d = r
s). Selfish 
borrowers choose project B irrespective of the form of their contract. 
                                                 
23 Under the parameter conditions in the experiment this equivalent to a repayment of 166 (see Section III.A). 
24 In the absence of reputational incentives the expected profit if the lender offers the contract (p





s, while the expected profit if he offers the contract (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) is (xw
A + (1 – x)w
B)r
t.   34 
Proof: 
Proof is by construction and is established in three steps: 
Step 1 (project choice of trustworthy borrowers): 
We have assumed that trustworthy borrowers who get a contract of the form (p
d = A, r
d ≤ r
t) 
honor the contract terms suggested by the lender if possible. Thus, all trustworthy borrowers 
who succeed in accepting a contract (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) in period 1 and 2 choose project A. 
However, trustworthy borrowers who are offered a contract (p
d = B, r
d = r
s) choose project B. 
Step 2 (project choice and repayments of selfish borrowers): 
Since period 2 is the final period selfish borrowers behave exactly as in a one-shot interaction: 
whenever they succeed in getting a contract they maximize their period profit by choosing 
project B. Thus, if a selfish borrower gets a contract (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) in period 2, his expected 
profit is E[pB] = w
B(R
B – r
t). If he gets a contract (p
d = B, r
d = r
s) his expected profit is 
identical to his outside option E[pB] = w
B(R
B – r
s) = b. 
In period 1 the situation is different. Assume that a selfish borrower has accepted a 
contract (p
d = A, r
d = r
t). Since project A has a higher success probability, choosing project A 
may make sense if the lender conditions the probability with which he offers another contract 
of the form (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) to his borrower in period 2 on the borrower’s repayment behavior. 
Define m(r) as the probability with which a lender renews his contract with his borrower in 
period 2 after observing the repayment r in period 1. After a repayment r in period 1 a selfish 
borrower’s continuation payoff for period 2 is: V(r) = m(r)w
B(R
B – r
t) + (1 – m(r))b. This 
implies that a selfish borrower is willing to choose project A if the following project choice 









t) – V(0)), where the difference 
in continuation payoffs can be rewritten as V(r
t) – V(0) = (m(r




The lenders’ contract renewal probabilities given in Proposition A3 imply that the 
project  choice  condition  is  satisfied  with  equality,  i.e.,  a  selfish  borrower  is  indifferent 
between project A and project B. Accordingly, any probability z Î [0,1] of choosing project A 
is optimal. 
Step 3: Sequential Rationality and Credit Contract Offers of Lenders 
Sequential rationality requires that a lender’s belief y about the trustworthiness of a borrower 
is defined at every information structure in the game. The initial prior, that is the probability 
that a lender assigns to the event that an unknown borrower is trustworthy, is given by the 
population fraction of trustworthy borrowers: y(Æ) = x. If a lender interacts with a borrower in   35 
period  1  he  updates  his  belief  about  the  trustworthiness  of  this  borrower  based  on  the 
observed repayment using Bayes’ Rule. Accordingly, the lender’s belief after a repayment of 
r = r
t is given by y(r
t) = w
Ax / [w
A(x + (1 – x)z) + w
B(1 – x)(1 – z)], while the lender’s belief 
after default (r = 0) is y(0) = (1 – w
A)x / [(1 – w
A)(x + (1 – x)z) + (1 – w
B)(1 – x)(1 – z)]. 
  Let us now turn to the credit offers of lenders.  In period 2 lenders anticipate that 
borrowers face the same incentives as in a one-shot interaction. Accordingly, a lender is only 
willing to make a credit offer to a specific borrower if his belief about this borrower satisfies 






t (see above). Since we assume that the population 






t, a borrower who does 
not repay in period 1 does not get a renewed contract from his lender in period 2. The reason 







t. This implies that the contract renewal probability after default is zero: m(0) = 0. 
  In  order  to  get  a  credit  offer  after  repaying  in  period  1  the  selfish  borrower's 
probability of choosing project A has to be low enough such that the lender's updated belief at 








t. This yields the following condition for the selfish borrower’s probability of 















t)] < 1. Given that m(0) = 0 the project choice condition from Step 2 implies that this 
repayment probability can only be best response of a selfish borrower if the lender’s contract 













t) – b)]. However, this contract renewal probability can only be a best response 
of the lender, if the lender is indifferent between offering the contract (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) to his 
incumbent  borrower  and  making  a  public  credit  offer  of  the  form  (p
d  =  B,  r
d  =  r
s). 























t)]. Furthermore, in period 1 lenders are only willing to offer a 
contract of the form (p
d = A, r
d = r
t) if the total fraction of borrowers who choose project A 
ensures  that  they  are  at  least  indifferent  between  offering  this  contract  and  offering  the 
contract (p
d = B, r
d = r
s). This requires that the following condition holds: [w
A(x + (1 – x)z) + 
w
B(1 – x)(1 – z)]r
t ³ w
Br
s. Given the repayment behavior of selfish borrowers in period 1 this 
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Table I: Characteristics of Projects 
 
The table displays the characteristics of the two projects available to borrowers. 
Project A has a high probability of success and maximizes the expected returns 
on  investment.  Project  B  is  an  inefficient  high-risk  project.  Due  to  limited 
liability and wealth constraints Project B can be attractive to borrowers when 
they plan or have to make a positive repayment in case of project success. 
 
Project A Project B
Required investment (i) 32 32
Probability of success (w
p) 0.8 0.3
Return in case of success (R
p) 100 200
Return in case of failure 0 0
Expected return (E[R | p] = w
pR
p) 80 60Table II: Conditional Contract Renewals in the RC 
 
The table reports regression estimates using individual data on credit contract renewals in the RC. All columns report probit estimates for the probability that a borrower 
receives a private offer from the same lender in the next period. The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator variable which takes on the value 1 if the borrower 
received a private offer from the same lender in the next period and 0 otherwise. In regression [1] we regress the dependent variable on the repayment level in the current 
period (Column ME [1] shows the corresponding marginal effects). In regression [2] we add the average repayment in all past periods and the number of previous 
interactions to the set of explanatory variables (Column ME [2] shows the corresponding marginal effects). In regression [3] we regress the dependent variable on an 
indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the borrower has made a positive repayment in the current period (Column ME [3] shows the corresponding marginal effects). 
In regression [4] we add the percentage of positive repayments in previous interactions and the number of previous interactions to the regression (Column ME [4] shows the 
corresponding marginal effects). 
 
Dependent variable Private offer of the same lender in the next period
[1] ME [1] [2] ME [2] [3] ME [3] [4] ME [4]
Current repayment 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Previous repayments 0.011** 0.004**
[0.005] [0.002]
Positive current repayment 1.318*** 0.477*** 1.346*** 0.482***
[0.056] [0.014] [0.112] [0.027]
Positive previous repayments 0.689*** 0.271***
[0.239] [0.094]
Previous interactions 0.090*** 0.035*** 0.077*** 0.031***
[0.023] [0.009] [0.020] [0.008]
Constant -0.949*** -1.581*** -0.911*** -1.555***
[0.115] [0.154] [0.119] [0.159]
Observations 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565  
 Table III: Expected Borrower Profits per Project in the RC and TPC 
 
This table shows how much borrowers can gain in terms of expected short term 
profit if they choose project B although the lender asked for project A. The table 
displays expected period profits of borrowers for each possible project choice 
conditional  on  the  total  number  of  interactions  with  the  current  lender.  The 
numbers in brackets display the number of observations. In the TPC it is simple 
to calculate the expected profits. Since the desired repayment is enforceable, we 
take all concluded contracts in which the lender desired project A and calculate 
the  expected  profits  as  follows:  Expected  profit  =  Probability  of  success  x 
(Project  return  –  Desired  repayment).  In  the  RC,  in  contrast,  the  desired 
repayment is not binding and the borrower can repay as much as he wants. In 
this case we take all accepted contracts in which the lender desired project A and 
the borrower successfully completed a project (either A or B). We calculate the 
expected profits as follows: Expected profit = Probability of success x (Project 
return – Observed repayment). We need to restrict the database to contracts with 
successful projects because the intended repayment in case of project failure is 
not  observable.  This  does  not  bias  the  results,  because  project  success  is 
determined randomly. 
 
Interactions Project A Project B Project A Project B
 1-3 54 50 21 38
 4-10 43 46 22 38








 Table IV: Conditional Contract Renewals in the RC and the TPC 
 
The table reports regression estimates using individual data on credit contract renewals in the RC and the TPC. All columns report probit estimates for the probability that a 
borrower receives a private offer from the same lender in the next period. The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator variable which takes on the value 1 if the 
borrower received a private offer from the same lender in the next period and 0 otherwise. In regression [1] we regress the dependent variable on the repayment level in the 
current period, a dummy variable for the TPC and the interaction terms of these two variables (Column ME [1] shows the corresponding marginal effects). In regression [2] we 
add the average repayment level in all past periods, the number of previous interactions and the corresponding interaction terms with the TPC dummy to the set of explanatory 
variables (Column ME [2] shows the corresponding marginal effects). In regressions [3] and [4] we replace current repayment level and average past repayment level with an 
indicator for a positive repayment and the percentage of positive repayments in previous interactions (Column ME [3] and ME [4] show the corresponding marginal effects). 
 
Dependent variable Private offer of the same lender in the next period
[1] ME[1] [2] ME[2] [3] ME[3] [4] ME[4]
Current repayment 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Current repayment x TPC -0.021***  -0.005***
1 -0.021***  -0.005***
1
[0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
Previous repayments 0.011** 0.004**
[0.005] [0.002]
Previous repayments x TPC -0.006  -0.001.
1
[0.005] [0.001]
Positive current repayment 1.318*** 0.454*** 1.346*** 0.454***
[0.053] [0.017] [0.106] [0.027]
Positive current repayment x TPC -0.284***  -0.132***
1 -0.366**  -0.147***
1
[0.078] [0.039] [0.143] [0.044]
Positive previous repayments 0.689*** 0.255***
[0.225] [0.084]
Positive previous repayments x TPC 0.143 0.029.
1
[0.309] [0.084]
Previous interactions 0.090*** 0.034*** 0.077*** 0.029***
[0.021] [0.008] [0.019] [0.007]
Previous interactions x TPC 0.052** 0.015.
1 0.029 0.006.
1
[0.026] [0.008] [0.027] [0.008]
TPC 0.222 0.084 0.168 0.063 -0.15 -0.057 -0.211 -0.078
[0.157] [0.060] [0.164] [0.061] [0.154] [0.058] [0.169] [0.063]
Constant -0.949*** -1.581*** -0.911*** -1.555***
[0.108] [0.145] [0.112] [0.150]
Observations 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239
1 Since the interaction effect does not correspond to the marginal effect of the interaction term in non-linear estimations, we used the procedure recommended by Ai and Norton 




Figure I: Realized Fraction of Available Number of Contracts over Time 
 
The figure displays the development of the realized fraction of the available number of contracts 
over the 20 periods of the experiment in the OC, the RC and the TPC. 
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Figure II: Average Repayments and Fraction of Ex Ante Profitable Contracts in the OC 
 
Panel  A:  The  figure  displays  the  development  of  average  repayments  over  time  in  the  OC.  The  grey  line 
represents the lenders’ outside option (endowment storing) of 32.  
Panel B: The figure shows the fraction of concluded contracts that were efficient from an ex ante perspective. 
There are two cases in which the contract is profitable to the lender from an ex ante perspective. The first case is 
that the borrower chooses project A and repays at least 40 in case of success (Expected Profit = 0.8 x 40 = 32). 
The second case is that the borrower chooses project B and repays at least 107 (Expected Profit = 0.3 x 107  » 32). 
In both these cases the expected profit for the lender is at least 32. In contracts with project failures we do not 
observe how much the borrower would have repaid if the project had been a success. Accordingly, we only use 
contracts with successful projects as the database for this figure. However, since project success is randomly 
determined, this does not bias the results. 
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Figure III: Average repayments in the OC and RC and Individual Repayments in the RC 
 
Panel A: The figure displays the development of average repayments after project success in the OC and the RC. 
Panel  B:  The  figure  shows  the  frequency  of  positive  repayments  in  periods  1-18  and  periods  19-20  of  the 
experiment  using  individual  data  from  the  RC.  Each  point  in  the  figure  represents  one  or  several  identical 
individuals. The size of the point indicates the number of observations. 
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Figure IV: Cumulative Frequency of Interactions of the Same Pair in the OC and RC 
 
The figure displays the cumulative frequency of trades which take place within pairs who interact 
a certain number of times with each other. 
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Figure V: Project Choice and Repayments Conditional on the Number of Interactions of a Pair 
 
Panel A: The figure displays the frequency with which project A is chosen in concluded contracts conditional on 
the number of interactions of the same pair in the RC. 
Panel B: The figure shows the average repayment after project success conditional on the number of interactions 
of the same pair in the RC. 
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Figure VI: Cumulative Frequency of Interactions of the Same Pair in the RC and TPC 
 
 
The figure displays the cumulative frequency of trades which take place within pairs who interact 
a certain number of times with each other. 
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Figure VII: Project Choice and Repayments Conditional on the Number of Interactions of a Pair 
 
Panel A: The figure displays the frequency with which project A is chosen in concluded contracts conditional on 
the number of interactions of the same pair in the TPC. 
Panel B: The figure shows the average repayment conditional on the number of interactions of the same pair in 
the TPC. 
 
 